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  A currency crisis, defined as a sharp decrease in the nominal value of 
the currency, could have a significant impact on the economy in terms of 
contraction of output, increase in unemployment and even collapse of banks.  
Over the last three decades, the frequency of currency crises has increased; but 
it is the increase in their magnitude, particularly that of the East Asian crisis of 
1997, that is most significant.  
 
  The increase in the number of these crises and the importance of their 
impact of the economy has generated a large amount of research into their 
causes.  At the theoretical level, the literature distinguishes between two main 
types of models of currency crises.  The first, which was prevalent over the 
1980s, identifies weaknesses in economic fundamentals as the causes of the 
crisis and the persistence of these weaknesses makes maintenance of the 
pegged exchange rate regime unsustainable and thus the crisis inevitable.  The 
second type of models was motivated by the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS) crisis of 1992-93 in which a 
speculative attack on some currencies resulted in a widening of the band 
despite the fact that based on fundamentals the pegs were sustainable.   This 
type of models focuses on the self-fulfilling features of currency crises and its 
major implication is that these crises are very hard to predict.  
 
  Based on theoretical priors, a number of models have been developed 
and applied for the purpose of predicting currency crises.  The idea is that if a 
model that could predict a currency crisis with some degree of accuracy were 
available, then policymakers could take the necessary actions to avoid the crisis 
or at least minimize its impact.  A few models have claimed success based on 





  The purpose of the present paper is to discuss the issues mentioned 
above and then apply the main currency crises indicators identified in the 
literature to the case of Arab countries.  Section 2 reviews the main theories of 
currency crises.  Section 3 analyzes three of the most cited models as having 
provided some conclusive results regarding predictability of currency crises.  
Based on the discussion in the previous two sections, section 4 focuses on a 
group of Arab countries that officially adopt a pegged exchange rate regime.  
The objective of the exercise is to detect any potential vulnerability of these 
countries to currency crises.  Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2. Theoretical models of currency crises 
 
  The issue of predictability of currency crises will ultimately be settled at 
the empirical level.  In the next section, the main empirical models that have 
recently attempted to predict currency crises will be discussed.  The objective 
will be to highlight the main indicators that have been identified by these 
models, before using them in the case of Arab countries.  However, empirical 
models are based to different degrees on theories of currency crises.  From this 
perspective, a brief review of these theories is called for.  
 
  Over the last twenty years, quite a few theoretical models of currency 
crises have been developed.  However, these models have been classified in the 
literature into two main types commonly called the “first generation” and the 
“second generation” models.  The first generation models, which started with 
the work of Krugman (1979), focus on the incompatibility between domestic 
conditions and the maintenance of a pegged exchange rate.   The second 
generation models emphasize the trade-off between the benefits and the costs 




  In his model, Krugman assumes a small open economy which produces 
a single tradable good whose price is determined on world markets; through 
purchasing power parity, the domestic price of the good is equal to the nominal 
exchange rate.  Full flexibility of prices and wages assures that output is always 
at full employment.  The difference between output and spending determines 
the balance of payments.  Only two assets are available to investors, domestic 
and foreign money with nominal interest rates on both set at zero.  The 
expected rate of inflation is the expected rate of depreciation of the domestic 
currency.  Under a pegged exchange rate regime, the government keeps a stock 
of foreign reserves and uses it to maintain the peg.  
 
  In this model, a budget deficit due to an expansionary fiscal policy can 
be financed either by issuing new money or by running down the stock of 
foreign reserves held by the central bank.  The rate at which the stock of 
foreign reserves decreases depends on the willingness of the private agents to 
acquire additional domestic money.  When the level of foreign reserves reaches 
a critical threshold, a speculative attack is launched on the currency, 
eliminating the remaining stock of foreign reserves held by the central bank 
and thus the peg is abandoned and the currency depreciates.  Therefore, 
according to the Krugman model, a currency crisis is caused by weak 
macroeconomic fundamentals such as excessively expansionary fiscal and 
monetary policies which lead to a continuous loss of foreign reserves until the 
peg can no longer be maintained.  In this model, the persistent weakness in the 
fundamentals makes the crisis inevitable.  
 
  Following Krugman’s work, a number of models have extended the 
original framework in several directions.  Agenor et al. (1992) provide a review 
of these extensions.  First, regarding the postcollapse exchange rate regime, a 
number of alternatives can be considered.  One is for the central bank to adopt 
a floating rate for a certain period before returning to a peg.  Under this  
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scenario, the size of the expected devaluation and the length of the expected 
transitional float affect the timing of the crisis; in other words, the larger the 
expected devaluation and the shorter the expected transitional float, the earlier 
the speculative attack on the currency and therefore the crisis.  Second, some 
models have introduced uncertainty about domestic credit growth and about the 
level of foreign reserves that the central bank is willing to use to defend the 
peg.  In the first case, uncertainty helps explain increases in domestic interest 
rates prior to a crisis.  In the second case, the implication is that the time of 
collapse of the pegged exchange rate regime cannot be determined explicitly.  
Third, in the presence of forward-looking wage contracts, an anticipated future 
collapse of the pegged exchange rate regime causes wages to rise and therefore 
prices start to increase.  Consequently, the real exchange rate appreciates.  This 
loss of competitiveness shows in the trade balance which deteriorates in the 
period preceding the collapse of the currency.  Fourth, the issue of capital 
controls, not addressed by Krugman, was considered in extensions to his 
model.  If the government imposes permanent controls on capital movements, 
this measure will prolong the maintenance of the pegged exchange rate regime.    
However, it will cause the development of a parallel market for foreign 
exchange to the detriment of the level of official foreign reserves.  If capital 
controls are temporary, official foreign reserves will be reduced through 
current account transactions in the form of increased imports which may speed 
up eruption of the crisis.  
 
  Unlike the first generation models of currency crises in which the 
persistent weakness in fundamentals makes the collapse of the pegged 
exchange rate regime inevitable, the second generation models emphasize the 
trade-off between the benefits and the costs of maintaining a peg.  These 
models were developed following the ERM of the EMS crisis of 1992-93 in 
which it was observed that the exchange rates that were attacked were not 
unsustainable in the sense that fundamentals of the economies in question were 
weak and foreign reserves crossed the critical threshold.   
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  One feature of these models is that policymakers continuously weigh the 
benefits and costs associated with maintenance of the peg.  As long as the 
benefits exceed the costs, the peg will be maintained.  However, whenever the 
costs outweigh the benefits, policymakers will find it optimal to abandon the 
peg.   In Ozkan and Sutherland (1995), for instance, one benefit derived from 
maintenance of the peg is to obtain credibility in the fight against inflation.  
However, an increase in foreign interest rates will lead to an increase in 
domestic interest rates.  The cost comes in the form of a lower level of  output. 
If foreign interest rates rise beyond a certain level, the cost of maintaining the 
peg becomes larger that the benefits and policymakers will abandon the peg.  
Therefore, it is the changes in some important economic variables, due to 
certain shocks either domestic or external, that make policymakers abandon the 
peg.   
 
  In these models, a currency crisis can also erupt without any significant 
change in fundamentals but because of a speculative attack on the currency 
motivated by market participants’ expectations of a collapse of the peg.   In this 
framework, two outcomes are identified.  One is that without the speculative 
attack, the peg can be maintained indefinitely.  Another is that the currency of 
an economy with sound macroeconomic fundamentals can also be attacked.  In 
this case, speculators anticipate that fundamentals will change after the attack 
due to their actions and to the response of policymakers, thereby validating ex-
post the incompatibility between the previous peg and the new fundamentals, 
and therefore their decision to attack the currency.  
 
  Obstfeld (1996) presents some mechanisms through which currency 
crises with self-fulfilling features, or self-fulfilling crises, erupt.  One such 
mechanism is when expectations of a currency depreciation drive up domestic 
interest rates in a country with a high public debt.   In this case, out of concern 
for the higher cost of servicing the public debt, the government will abandon  
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the peg.  Another mechanism is when expectations of a depreciation, which 
lead to higher domestic interest rates, put the banking sector under pressure.  In 
this case, rather than face a possible costly bailout of banks, the government 
will abandon the peg.  
 
  One important characteristic of these models is that they allow for the 
possibility of multiple equilibria and shifts across these equilibria; that is, the 
economy can move from an equilibrium with no devaluation expectations and a 
sustainable peg to an equilibrium with high devaluation expectations and a peg 
that becomes unsustainable, without a change in fundamentals.  Thus, unlike in 
the Krugman model where a decrease of foreign reserves to a critical threshold 
will trigger a currency crisis, a major implication of the second generation 
models is that a crisis is very hard to predict.  
 
  Jeanne (1997) presents a model of currency crisis in which he attempts 
to reconcile the two main theories discussed above.  The author argues that 
self-fulfilling speculation is a phenomenon that results from a bifurcation in the 
fundamentals; that is, when the fundamentals cross a certain level, speculation 
becomes self-fulfilling.  The author also provides an empirical illustration of 
this approach, using the French franc crisis of 1992-93.  
 
  Finally, some authors have argued that currency crises are caused by 
contagious effects.  Following the theoretical work by Gerlach and Smets 
(1995), Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996) undertake a test of this 
hypothesis.  They find that a speculative attack elsewhere in the world raises 
the probability of an attack on the domestic currency by 8%.   
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3. Indicators of currency crises: empirical evidence 
  
  In the present section, the focus will be on three of the most cited 
empirical models for predicting currency crises, which also differ in terms of 
the methodology adopted.  These models are from: Frankel and Rose (1996), 
Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) and Kaminsky, Lizondo and  Reinhart 
(1998).  
 
  Frankel and Rose apply a model to estimate the probability of a currency 
crash, using a panel of annual data for 105 developing countries over the period 
1971-1992.  The authors first define a currency crash as “a nominal 
depreciation of the currency of at least 25% that is also at least a 10% increase 
in the rate of depreciation” (p. 352), thus excluding high inflation cases.  To 
avoid counting the same crisis more that once, they also set a three-year 
window around a crash period. They use a large number of explanatory 
variables classified as follows: domestic macroeconomic indicators, external 
variables, debt composition and foreign variables.  Following a graphical 
analysis of the variables they selected, the authors pool the data across 
countries and periods and estimate probit models using both contemporaneous 
and lagged regressors.    After conducting robustness checks to their regression 
results, the authors conclude that the probability of a currency crash increases 
when the share of foreign direct investment to total debt decreases, domestic 
credit growth is high, GDP growth is low, and when foreign interest rates are 
high.  
 
  The second model considered is that of Sachs, Tornell and Velasco in 
which the authors analyze the severity of the Mexican crisis of 1994 and its 
impact on emerging markets, using a cross section of twenty countries in 1995.  
They define a crisis index as the weighted average of the percent depreciation 
of the nominal exchange rate and the percent decrease in reserves, from  
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November 1994 to April 1995.  Their explanatory variables include real 
exchange rate appreciation and growth in credit to the private sector as a 
fraction of GDP (a proxy for banking system weakness) which represent 
fundamentals, and the ratio of reserves to M2 as a proxy for reserve adequacy.  
Their argument is that for a country to face a currency crisis, it has to have both 
weak fundamentals and inadequate reserves (exchange rate appreciation, 
lending boom and reserves/M2 in the lowest quartile of the sample).  With R
2 
equal to 0.69, they conclude that their model describes well the cross-country 
pattern of currency crises in emerging markets in the period they covered.  
 
Kaminsky, Lizondo and  Reinhart propose the “signals” approach, an 
early warning system of currency crises which consists of monitoring the 
evolution of a set of economic indicators which tend to behave differently in 
the periods leading up to a crisis.  The authors define a crisis as “a situation in 
which an attack on the currency leads to a sharp depreciation of the currency, a 
large decline in international reserves, or a combination of both” (p. 15).   
Empirically, they identify a crisis by the behavior of an index of exchange 
market pressure which is a weighted average of monthly percentage changes in 
the exchange rate and gross international reserves.  Based on theoretical priors 
and on the availability of data on a monthly basis, the authors choose 15 
economic indicators: international reserves, imports, exports, the terms of 
trade, deviations of the real exchange rate from trend, the differential between 
foreign and domestic real interest rates on deposits, excess real M1 balances, 
the money multiplier, the ratio of domestic credit to GDP, the real interest rate 
on deposits, the ratio of nominal lending to deposit interest rates, the stock of 
commercial banks deposits, the ratio of broad money to gross international 
reserves, an index of output and an index of equity prices.   Except for the 
deviation of the real exchange rate from trend, excess real M1 balances and the 
variables based on interest rates, the indicator is defined as the percentage 




The authors set the signaling horizon at 24 months and consider that an 
indicator issues a signal whenever it departs from its mean and crosses a given 
threshold level.  For each indicator, they choose a country-specific threshold 
level so as to establish a balance between the risks of issuing false signals and 
not issuing signals about an upcoming crisis.   In their examination of the 
effectiveness of individuals indicators, the authors extend the empirical 
analysis undertaken in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996).  In that paper, the 
authors analyze the links between banking and currency crises and include 76 
currency crises in 20 countries (15 developing and 5 developed) over the period 
1970-1995.  
 
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart analyze the performance of each 
indicator in terms of the matrix presented below.  
 
  Crisis within 24 months  No crisis within 24 months 
Signal was issued   A  B 
No signal was issued  C  D 
 
Each of the 4 cells represents months.  For example, cell A would show for a 
particular indicator the number of months in which the indicator would issue a 
signal of a crisis which would actually occur within the next 24 months.  Based 
on the framework of the above matrix, the authors present in a summary table 
the performance of all indicators under the signals approach.  The table 
provides data on the percentage of crises called, the percentage of good signals 
to possible good signals () ) ( C A A + , the percentage of bad signals to possible 
bad signals () ) ( D B B + , the ratio of false signals to good signals, or the noise-
to signal ratio [] [] ()   ) (   ) (     C A A D B B + +  and the percentage of crises for which 




The authors also calculate for each indicator both the average number of 
months in advance of the crisis when the first signal occurs (average lead time) 
and the persistence of the signals, the average number of signals per period, 
during the period preceding a crisis relative to tranquil times.  Based on the 
empirical examination of the various indicators included in the study, the 
authors conclude that those that performed the best as leading indicators are: 
deviations of the real exchange rate from trend, exports, equity prices, the ratio 
of broad money to gross international reserves and output.  
 
Furman and Stiglitz (1998) discuss a number of issues related to the East 
Asian crisis of 1997.  In this context, they analyze the three empirical models 
reviewed above, developed and estimated before that crisis, and apply them to 
the East Asian countries in order to assess their forecasting accuracy.  When 
applying the Frankel and Rose model, they find very low probabilities of crises 
in East Asian countries and thus conclude that it would not have predicted that 
crisis.  They reach a similar conclusion when they apply the Sachs, Tornell and 
Velasco model.   Regarding the Kamisky, Lizondo and Reinhart model, 
Furman and Stiglitz find that it would have performed better than the previous 
two models in predicting the East Asian crisis.  However they argue that, 
because it adopts a common percentile threshold, this model has a tendency to 
overpredict crises in countries with a history of good fundamentals and 
underpredict them in countries with a history of bad fundamentals.  
 
In line with the work undertaken by Furman and Stiglitz, Berg and 
Pattillo (1999) evaluate the same three models and assess their predictive 
power.  This out-of-sample exercise leads to conclusions that are largely 
consistent with those of Furman and Stiglitz.  In effect, both the Frankel and 
Rose, and the Sachs, Tornell and Velasco models do not provide any useful 
forecasts, even with the addition of other explanatory variables.  As to the 
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart model, the authors find that it achieved some  
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success such as in terms of ranking countries by severity of crisis.  But, when 
they add two variables, the level of the ratio of M2 to reserves and the ratio of 
the current account to GDP (which they believe are important potential 
determinants of currency crises), the augmented model performs better out-of-
sample than the original model.  
 
 
4. Behavior of indicators for Arab countries 
  
In the previous section, the focus was on three studies that have claimed 
success in predicting currency crises, based on in-sample prediction.  The 
choice of variables used in these studies was based on the main theories of 
currency crises.  However, when applied for out-of-sample prediction, those 
empirical models failed though to a lesser extent for the Kaminsky, Lizondo 
and Reinhart model.  Therefore, the search for a model capable of forecasting 
currency crises with some degree of accuracy and consistency continues.  This, 
in no way, is intended to imply that the large amount of work undertaken so far 
in this direction should be discarded.  The literature, both theoretical and 
empirical, has identified a large set of variables that could at least be useful in 
the task of detecting vulnerability to currency crises.   From this perspective, 
and given the lack of studies on Arab countries in this area, the present section 
will focus exclusively on Arab countries.  The objective will be essentially to 
analyze the behavior of some of the main indicators identified in the literature, 
and thus attempt to uncover any potential vulnerability of Arab economies to 
currency crises.  
 
The group of Arab countries covered includes only those that officially 
adopt a pegged exchange rate regime, that is: Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, 
Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria and United Arab Emirates.  Three 
countries peg their currency to the U.S. dollar, five to the SDR and two to a 
basket of currencies (table 1 at the end of the text).   Due to a lack of data on  
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several variables identified in the literature as potential indicators of 
vulnerability to currency crises, the present exercise focuses only on annual 
observations on nine variables over the period 1995-1998.  Two of these 
variables, depreciation of the nominal exchange rate against the U.S. dollar 
(table 2) and inflation (table 3), should be examined jointly; thus grossly 
measuring changes in the real exchange rate against the dollar (given that the 
inflation rate in the U.S. was less than 3% over the period in question).  Data 
on real GDP growth rate are presented in table 4.   Fiscal expansion is 
represented by the ratio of fiscal surplus to GDP (table 5).  Monetary expansion 
is represented by the growth rate of domestic credit (table 6).  Adequacy of 
reserves is represented in two ways: the ratio of M2 to reserves (table 7) and 
the ratio of reserves to imports (table 8).  Finally, the external position of the 
countries under study is represented by both the ratio of the current account to 
GDP (table 9) and the ratio of the external debt to GDP (table 10).  
 
It can be observed from table 2 that six of the ten Arab countries had the 
nominal exchange rate of their currencies against the dollar fixed over the 
period 1995-98, and in fact for much longer than that.  Combined with the 
figures from table 3 on inflation, the real exchange rate of those currencies 
against the dollar actually declined over the period for most of them, except for 
Qatar where it slightly increased over the last year (inflation up from 2.8% to 
3.1%).  Jordan experienced no change in the nominal rate over the last two 
years, but an increase in the real rate in the last year though by a small 
percentage.  For the other Arab countries, while Morocco experienced a 
depreciation of the real rate over the last three years, Libya’s real rate 
consistently increased by more than 15% over the same period, even surpassing 
the 30% rate of increase in 1996.  
 
Except for Morocco and Jordan, the other Arab countries in the sample 
are oil producers and the oil sector represents an important part of their GDP 
and a main source of their government revenues.  Thus, it is expected that the  
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figures in tables 4 (real GDP growth rate) and 5 (fiscal surplus/GDP) reinforce 
each other for those countries.  Furthermore, the sharp decrease in world oil 
prices from the end of 1997 to early 1999 should be reflected significantly in 
the figures for 1998.  A look at the numbers in the two tables indicates that it is 
indeed the case.  For Jordan, the ratio of the fiscal deficit to GDP increased 
sharply in 1998 although the economy contracted only slightly. As to Morocco, 
the growth of its GDP is heavily dependent on agricultural output which in turn 
is highly exposed to weather conditions.  
 
Regarding the indicator of monetary expansion, domestic credit growth, 
the figures in table 6 show sharp changes in the rate of growth, both positive 
and negative, over the period for most countries.  Over the last two years, the 
most noticeable numbers concern Bahrain, Jordan, Oman and Qatar for the 
sharp increases in the rate; Kuwait and Morocco for the slowdown in the 
expansion and Saudi Arabia for the contraction.  
 
With respect to the adequacy of reserves represented by two ratios, 
broad money (M2) to foreign exchange reserves (table 7) and reserves to 
imports (table 8), figures on two countries stand out: the low level of reserves 
relative to M2 and imports for Saudi Arabia and the high level for Libya.  The 
ratios for the other Arab countries are not far apart.  However, for all countries 
and over the four years, no significant deterioration in the ratios was observed.  
 
The external position of Arab countries is represented by the ratio of 
current account to GDP (table 9) and that of external debt to GDP (table 10).  
Between 1997 and 1998, all oil producing countries experienced a worsening 
of their current account position.  Even Jordan and Morocco faced a similar 
situation.  The highest deficits as a percent of GDP were recorded in Bahrain, 
Oman and Qatar at around 17%.  Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates are the 
only countries that show a positive ratio of current account to GDP over the 
whole period.  As to the ratio of external debt to GDP, it is highest in the cases  
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of Jordan and Qatar (114.9% and 100%, respectively in 1998).  However, the 
ratios have been moving in opposite direction for these two countries, 
decreasing for Jordan and increasing for Qatar.  For the other countries, 
Morocco’s debt is the highest with respect to GDP (53.4% in 1998) but has 
been declining annually while those of Oman and the United Arab Emirates 
have sharply increased in the last year (by about 44% and 40%, respectively).  
 
Regardless of the strength of economic fundamentals, for a speculative 
attack on a currency to succeed the capital account must be open; in other 
words, inward and outward capital flows must be unrestricted.  Otherwise, the 
monetary authorities can maintain the pegged exchange rate for a much longer 
period of time (although at the cost of the emergence of a parallel foreign 
exchange market or increased imports, as discussed previously).  In the case of 
the Arab countries covered in this study, the regulatory frameworks for current 
and (especially) capital transactions are presented in table 1.  With respect to 
current transactions, Libya and Syria are the only countries that have yet to 
accept the obligations of  Article VIII of the IMF Articles of Agreement.   
Regarding capital transactions, a few observations can be made.  Except 
Bahrain, all Arab countries impose controls on foreign direct investment.  Also, 
except Qatar, all have specific provisions regarding transactions conducted by 
commercial banks and other credit institutions.  Only four Arab countries 
impose controls on financial credits (Bahrain, Libya, Morocco and Syria).   
Finally, only Jordan and Qatar do not maintain any controls on capital and 
money market instruments.  Thus, the regulatory framework for capital 
transactions is by no means uniform across Arab countries.  While no country 
maintains a fully open capital account, countries differ in terms of types of 
transactions they chose to liberalize.  Overall, on a capital account openness 
scale, Libya, Morocco and Syria rank the lowest and Qatar the highest.   
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Based solely on an observation of the indicators, and without statistical 
tests of the type undertaken by Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart for instance, it 
can be stated that these indicators behaved differently across Arab countries.  
The sharp decrease in world oil prices over the last two years of the period did 
have a significant impact on oil exporting countries.  However, the indicators 
for some of these countries deteriorated much more than those for others.  In 
effect, Bahrain, Libya, Oman and Qatar had most of their indicators move in 
the “wrong” direction in a significant way.  For the non-oil producing 
countries, Jordan experienced a significant deterioration of its indicators, which 
implies increased vulnerability to currency crisis.  In effect, while an upturn in 
world oil prices (as seen since early 1999) will quickly lead to improvements in 
the indicators of oil exporting countries, Jordan’s economic structure combined 
with the relative openness of its capital account imply that its currency has 





This paper has addressed the issue of currency crises.  A currency crisis 
is generally defined as a situation in which a speculative attack on the currency 
leads to a sharp decrease in its nominal value.  Some authors also include in 
this definition a situation in which a speculative attack does not result in a 
devaluation of the currency but in a reduction of foreign exchange reserves and 
an increase in domestic interest rates.  The costs of a currency crisis to an 
economy may be significant, which makes the interest in this issue shown by 
both researchers and policymakers all the more relevant.  A currency crisis can 
occur jointly with a banking crisis, it can precede or follow a banking crisis, or 
it can occur without a banking crisis.  The links between the two types of crises 
are well established in the literature.  The focus in this paper has been only on 
currency crises.    
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After discussing the main types of theoretical models of currency crises, 
the first generation and second generation models, the paper has reviewed three 
of the most cited empirical models of currency crises.  Those models have 
claimed success in predicting currency crises, based on in-sample prediction.  
But, when applied for out-of-sample prediction, they showed their limitations.   
However, it should be recognized that currency crises are hard to predict 
because they are different from each other mainly in terms of the conditions of 
the countries in which they erupt.   Therefore, using a model or a set of 
indicators which may have performed well in one instance does not necessarily 
make them suitable in another situation.  Furthermore, as pointed out in the 
IMF World Economic Outlook (1998), even if models or indicators which 
could predict a currency crisis with a high degree of accuracy were available, 
they would lose their usefulness since market participants would take them into 
account and thus speed up occurrence of the crisis and policymakers would act 
to prevent its occurrence.  
 
Nevertheless, the literature on currency crises, both theoretical and 
empirical, has identified a large set of variables that could at least be useful in 
the task of detecting vulnerability to currency crises.  From this perspective, the 
last part of the paper has discussed the results of an exercise that focused 
exclusively on Arab countries and which relied on an observation of 
developments in the indicators. Based on the behavior of some of the main 
indicators identified in the literature, the objective was to attempt to uncover 
any potential vulnerability of Arab economies to currency crises.  As it turned 
out, discounting the impact of world oil prices on most Arab countries, a few of 
them do appear vulnerable to a currency crisis.  
  
  17
Table 1.  Exchange Arrangements and Regulatory Frameworks for Current and Capital Transactions in Arab Countries 
 
 
Exchange rate arrangements 
pegged to: 




























Bahrain  •      •      •    •      •   
Jordan  •       •       •    •   
Kuwait     •    •      •      •    •   
Libya    •       •    •    •    •    -  
Morocco     •    •      •    •    •    •   
Oman  •       •      •      •    •   
Qatar    •      •        •     
Saudi Arabia    •      •      •    •    •   
Syria  •         •    •    •    •    •   
United Arab Emirates    •      •      •      •    •   
Notes: *   No restrictions on payments and transfers for current transactions.  
** Maintenance of restrictions on payments and transfers for current transactions.  
 -   Not available.   
Sources:  
-  International Monetary Fund, Exchange Arrangements And Exchange Restrictions Annual Report 1998.  




Table 2.  Depreciation of Nominal Exchange Rate 
Against U.S. Dollar 
(in %) 
 
Country  1995 1996 1997 1998 
Bahrain  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Jordan  0.14 1.28 0.00 0.00 
Kuwait  0.40 -0.32 -1.64  1.10 
Libya  7.78 4.62 5.52 2.09 
Morocco  -5.48 3.90  10.39 4.72 
Oman  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Qatar  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Saudi Arabia  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Syria  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
United Arab Emirates  0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 
 
Source:  International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, February 2000. 
 
 
Table 3.  Inflation 
(in %) 
 
Country  1995 1996 1997 1998 
Bahrain  2.8  -0.2 0.2 0.2 
Jordan  2.3 6.5 3.0 4.5 
Kuwait  2.7 3.6 0.6 0.2 
Libya  26.7 38.9 25.0 24.2 
Morocco  6.2 3.0 0.9 2.9 
Oman  -1.1  0.3 -0.4 -0.5 
Qatar  3.0 7.4 2.8 3.1 
Saudi Arabia  4.9 1.2 0.0  -0.3 
Syria  8.0 8.2 2.3  -1.2 
United Arab Emirates  4.4 3.2 3.5 3.0 
 





Table 4.  Real GDP Growth 
(in %) 
 
Country  1995 1996 1997 1998 
Bahrain  4.0 4.1 3.1 0.4 
Jordan  5.9 0.6 1.3  -1.0 
Kuwait  1.0 3.3 2.8  -2.3 
Libya  2.0 1.1 0.5  -2.0 
Morocco  -6.6 12.1 -2.0  6.3 
Oman  4.8 2.9 6.4  -2.5 
Qatar  1.6 5.0  10.0 2.0 
Saudi Arabia  0.5 1.4 1.9 1.6 
Syria  5.8 4.5 1.3  -1.5 
United Arab Emirates  8.1 10.1  2.1 -2.0 
 
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report, Various Issues. 
 
 
Table 5.  Fiscal Surplus 
            GDP  
            (in %) 
 
Country  1995 1996 1997 1998 
Bahrain  -5.76 -2.40 -5.24 -5.01 
Jordan  -1.69 -3.15 -3.13 -6.86 
Kuwait  -13.78 -7.11  5.48 -4.82 
Libya  -5.10 1.02 0.00 0.00 
Morocco  -3.35 -3.32 -2.41 -1.83 
Oman  -9.03 -4.49 -0.66 -6.89 
Qatar  -4.20 -8.08 -8.60 -8.02 
Saudi Arabia  -5.73 -3.65 -2.87  -10.03 
Syria  -6.36 -4.38 -3.34 -4.31 
United Arab Emirates  -12.47 -12.82  -4.53 -16.93 
 




Table 6.  Domestic Credit Growth 
 (in %) 
 
Country  1995 1996 1997 1998 
Bahrain  17.93 -7.49 20.87 23.34 
Jordan  9.83 0.61 1.71  14.23 
Kuwait  10.53 -1.32 13.75  5.33 
Libya  7.92 -4.48  -15.84  1.90 
Morocco  14.61 5.98  49.25 8.51 
Oman  7.81 13.96 30.64 26.96 
Qatar  1.03  7.88 12.92 17.32 
Saudi Arabia  5.58 -1.99 18.27 -3.69 
Syria  10.24 -7.20  0.45  - 
United Arab Emirates  7.10 11.94 15.90 12.82 
 
Source:  International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, February 2000. 
 
 
M2  Table 7. 




Country  1995 1996 1997 1998 
Bahrain  3.10 3.09 3.41 5.02 
Jordan  3.69 4.15 3.57 4.37 
Kuwait  7.56 7.59 7.99 7.18 
Libya  4.54 3.88 3.35 - 
Morocco  6.24 6.03 5.60 6.02 
Oman  3.65 3.20 3.21 5.52 
Qatar  3.30 4.06 4.39 5.31 
Saudi Arabia  9.02 13.03 12.21 12.53 
Syria  - - - - 
United Arab Emirates  3.11 3.08 3.21 3.10 
 




Table 8.  Foreign Exchange Reserves 
            Imports  
 
Country  1995 1996 1997 1998 
Bahrain  0.38 0.34 0.35 0.34 
Jordan  0.60 0.46 0.60 0.51 
Kuwait  0.49 0.44 0.44 0.51 
Libya  0.93 0.99 1.13 1.22 
Morocco  0.36 0.39 0.42 0.43 
Oman  0.28 0.32 0.33 0.20 
Qatar  0.46 0.30 0.45 0.36 
Saudi Arabia  0.06 0.05  +0.05 0.05 
Syria  - - - - 
United Arab Emirates  0.30 0.29 0.28 0.37 
 
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report, Various Issues. 
 
 
 Table 9.  Current Account 
            GDP  
            (in %) 
 
Country  1995 1996 1997 1998 
Bahrain  3.3 2.8  -4.9  -17.9 
Jordan  -3.9  -3.3 0.4 0.04 
Kuwait  18.8 23.1 26.2 10.3 
Libya  0.6 5.4 2.8  -8.1 
Morocco  -3.6 0.09  -0.2  -1.5 
Oman  -5.8 1.2  -0.3  -17.1 
Qatar  -31.0 -29.3 -11.4 -17.0 
Saudi Arabia  -4.2 0.5 0.2  -9.9 
Syria  2.7 1.0 3.4  -1.5 
United Arab Emirates  13.7 15.3 14.6  5.8 
 





Table 10.  External Debt 
            GDP  
            (in %) 
 
Country  1995 1996 1997 1998 
Bahrain  52.7 41.3 39.3 45.9 
Jordan  122.9 120.1 116.7 114.9 
Kuwait  37.6 24.6 31.3 36.4 
Libya  - - - - 
Morocco  68.8 59.1 57.6 53.4 
Oman  23.1 22.4 23.1 33.3 
Qatar  60.0 79.1 96.7  100.0 
Saudi Arabia  - - - - 
Syria  0.15 0.13 0.13 0.12 
United Arab Emirates  23.7 24.4 24.1 33.7 
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On the Predictability of Currency Crises:  
The Use of Indicators in the  







A currency crisis could have a significant impact on the economy, as 
events from the East Asian crisis of 1997 have shown.  The increase in the 
number of currency crises over the last three decades has generated a large 
amount of research into their causes.  Theoretical models developed over this 
period have been classified in the literature into two main types commonly 
called the “first generation” and the “second generation” models.  The first 
generation models focus on the incompatibility between domestic conditions 
and the maintenance of a pegged exchange rate.  The second generation models 
emphasize the trade-off between the benefits and the costs of maintaining a 
peg.  Based on theoretical priors, empirical models have been developed and 
applied for the purpose of predicting currency crises.   After discussing both 
theoretical and empirical models and underlining the limitations of the latter, 
the last part of the paper focuses on a group of Arab countries that adopt a 
pegged exchange rate regime.   Using a set of indicators identified in the 
literature, the objective of the exercise is to attempt to detect any potential 
vulnerability of Arab economies to currency crises.  
  
 
 
 
 
 